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## INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY Hungary REPORT

SUBJECT Air Force Ground Fighter Intercept

DATE DISTR.

3 JUL 1957

NO. PAGES

11

REQUIREMENT NO.

RD

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO.

PLACE &amp; DATE ACQ.

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Ref #183

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SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE

- Attached to the Report are nine sketches on
- Seven main directions of expected aerial attacks (Enclosure 1)
  - Fighter intercept plan for penetration direction No. 1 (Enclosure 2)
  - Fighter intercept plans for penetration directions No. 2-7 (Enclosures 3-8)
  - Fighter intercept plan against enemy bomber formations from direction No. 1 (Enclosure 9)

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USAF review completed.

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INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

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REPORT

25X1

COUNTRY Hungary

DATE DISTR. 7 June 1957

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## Hungarian Air Force Ground Fighter Intercept

### General Information

1. The Hungarian People's Republic, under the guidance of the Soviet Union and in conjunction with Czechoslovakia and Rumania, worked out a mutual procedure for the intercept of enemy aircraft in case of an armed conflict. These procedures took into consideration the possible directions of attack, type of aircraft, and the number, speed and altitude of the enemy formation. The intercepts were worked out in relation to the respective defense commands with the above mentioned factors in mind. Operational exercises were worked out in theory about 100 times [redacted] at Tasszar Airfield and were put into actual practice about five times between October 1955 and November 1956.

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### Basis of Operational Exercises

2. Air defense exercises were usually based on an enemy formation of thirty bomber aircraft with fighter escort. Against this formation a regiment of Hungarian or Soviet fighter interceptors was to be used at one time. Intercept exercises were always based on the size of the attacking force. If an attacking force numbered 90 bombers, then a division of fighter-interceptors would strike the enemy formation. A flight of four enemy bombers would be attacked by a squadron, two flights of fighters. Intercept exercises also were always based on the assumption that the enemy force would be flying at an altitude of up to 10,000 meters and at a speed of 800 kilometers per hour. In case of a penetration by an enemy bomber unit with fighter escort, a feinting attack by a small formation of fighters would be made to draw off the fighter escort before the major intercept attack was begun.

### Expected Directions of Attack

3. Inclosure 1 is a [redacted] sketch of the seven main directions of expected aerial attack against or through Hungary. It also illustrates the fighter divisions' respective "lines of alert" (outer circle) and "lines of controlled intercept" (inner circle). When an enemy force reached the outer circle, fighter units would receive a final alert prior to scramble. The inner circle indicates the division control center's effective GCI range. The number of intercepts would depend upon the size of the enemy formation but the interceptor fighters would always outnumber the enemy formation by at least two to one. (The wartime TO & E of each regiment would include over 60 aircraft.) The regiment would be scrambled for assembly over a given point; in good weather it would be usually over Papa Airfield and in bad weather over the field's outer radio beacon. In figuring the loss of interceptors it was estimated that 25 to 50 percent of the fighter interceptors would be lost in the attack. The first intercept attack would be made by the regiment in one large close formation. The second intercept would be made in squadron formation

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and finally in flight formation. Generally a fighter division or regiment was thought capable of making a maximum of three attacks, but this number was more likely to be one or two. If the altitude of the enemy formation was below 8 or 9000 meters, the attack would be from the right and below the formation. If the enemy formation was at 8 or 9000 meters, the attack would be made from five hundred meters below and two kilometers behind the enemy formation. If the enemy formation was above 9000 meters, the intercept would be made from 500 meters above and two kilometers behind the target. The above procedures applied to all Hungarian and Soviet fighter divisions based in Hungary.

#### Intercept of Enemy Attack from Direction #1

4. Inclosure #2 is a  sketch of the fighter intercept plan for direction #1. Numbers in parentheses conform to numbers on the sketch.

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- (1) R. V. - P. RIASZTASI VONAL. Line of Alert for the Papa Division. When the target formation reached this line, which was three hundred kilometers from Papa Airfield (N 47-20, E 17-28), the Papa Special Fighter Division would scramble a regiment for assembly over the airfield in position for a directed intercept.
- (2) R. V. - T. RIASZTASI VONAL. Line of Alert for the Taszar Fighter Division. When the enemy formation reached this 300 kilometer alert line, the Taszar Fighter Division would scramble and position its fighter regiment for intercept between ESZTERGOM (N 47-47, E 18-45) and Lake Velence (N 47-13, E 18-35). The Taszar Division was charged with taking over the attack from the Papa Division.
- (3) I.V. - P. IRANY VONAL. Line of Controlled Intercept for the Papa Special Division. When the enemy formation reached this line, the Papa Division would go under GCI control for the intercept.
- (4) I.V. - T. IRANY VONAL - Line of Controlled Intercept for the Taszar Division.
- (5) EV. - P. ELFOGASI VONAL. Line of intercept for the Papa Division. This was the line where the first attack would be initiated by the Papa Division against the enemy formation.
- (6) R.V. - K. RIASZTASI VONAL. Line of Alert for the Kecskemet Fighter Division. When the enemy formation reached this 300 kilometer alert line the division would scramble a regiment for assembly over a given point.
- (7) I.V. - K. IRANY VONAL. Line of Controlled Intercept for the Kecskemet Division.
- (8) E.V. - T. ELFOGASI VONAL. Line of Intercept for the Taszar Division. When the enemy formation reached this line, the Taszar regiment's lead pilot would rock his wings indicating to the Papa regiment that it would take over the attack. This approx-

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imate line of intercept was between ESZTERGOM and Lake Velence.

- (9) L.V. - 2/3/ - P. LEVALASI VONAL. Break-off Line for the Papa Regiment. At this line two squadrons of the Papa regiment would break off the attack and return to base. One squadron, together with the Tassar Regiment, would continue the attack.
- (10) E.V. - K. ELFOGASI VONAL. Line of Intercept for the Kecskemet Regiment. When the enemy formation reached this line, running approximately along the Danube River, the Kecskemet Regiment would attack.
- (11) L.V. - 1/3 - P. LEVALASI VONAL. Break-off Line for the Papa Regiment. At this line the last squadron of the Papa Regiment would break off the attack and return to home base or to the nearest airfield.
- (12) L.V. 2/3 - T. LEVALASI VONAL. Break-off Line for the Tassar Regiment. At this line two squadrons of the Tassar Regiment would break off the attack to be replaced by the Kecskemet Regiment.
- (13) E.V. - R. ELFOGASI VONAL. Line of Intercept for Rumania. At this line the Rumanian Air Force would take over the intercept of the enemy formation, together with one squadron of the Kecskemet Regiment.
- (14) L.V. - 1/3 T. LEVALASI VONAL Break-off Line for the Last Squadron of the Tassar Regiment.
- (15) L.V. 2/3 - K. LEVALASI VONAL. Break-off Line for the Kecskemet Regiment. Two squadrons of the Kecskemet Regiment would break off the attack at this point while the last squadron would remain with the attacking Rumanian fighters.

#### Intercept of Enemy Attacks from Other Directions

5. Reference is made to Inclosures 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, sketches of fighter intercepts from six other directions. These intercept attacks were planned along the same lines as mentioned in paragraph 4. If one of the fighter divisions for one reason or another could not participate in the attack, then one of the neighboring divisions was assigned to intercept the enemy formation all along the line.
6. There was mutual coordination and orientation in air defense procedures among the USSR and the satellite nations. For example, if an enemy air penetration of Poland occurred, then the Moscow flight control center would be notified by direct telephone and in turn would notify the control centers of all Warsaw Pact nations. All satellite countries had direct telecommunication with each other. If for some reason one nation could not intercept the target over its respective area, then one of the neighboring nations would assume or continue the attack. If the air defense forces of one nation would be rendered unfit for fighting, then another satellite nation would undertake its defense, depending on the existing situation.   it could be expected that the defense

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forces of the Warsaw Pact nations would be integrated with each other. This was substantiated by a Hungarian ministerial decree of October 1956, which made the Russian language mandatory as a second language in the Hungarian armed forces for the purpose of better coordination and direction control among the Warsaw Pact nations. It was also agreed among the Warsaw Pact nations that all MIG-15s or 17s would be allowed to land at any of the satellite countries' airfields. This provision was made in order to allow the MIGs to refuel because of their short-range capability.

in case of a large-scale enemy attack over Hungary, some of the fighter airfields would be deserted while others would be over-crowded.

#### Results of 1956 Summer Air Force Exercises

7. The experiences of the 1956 combined summer air defense exercises over Hungary proved that the Hungarian Air Force, combined with the Soviet and other Satellite air forces, could intercept every target between an altitude of 1000 and 12,000 meters. On the other hand, the exercises proved also that with the present Hungarian personnel and technical equipment, the Hungarian Air Force would be incapable of carrying out its mission against targets below 1000 meters and above 14,000 meters. Therefore, it would be advantageous to carry out an enemy attack below or above the above-mentioned altitudes. The 1956 summer exercise also proved that in case of a large number of targets, the personnel of the early warning control centers (H.A.P.) became nervous and hesitant, rendering them incapable of making prompt decisions. As this was due to the fact that personnel at regiment control centers were not properly trained, the division HAPs were afraid to pass targets over to a regiment, and consequently chaos ensued at the division HAP. Another short-coming of the HAP personnel was that they were trained for the tracking of single targets; only recently was there a strong drive to train regiment HAP personnel and to integrate the regiment HAP as an independent control center within the Hungarian air defense system.

#### Detailed Intercept from Direction #1

8. Reference is made to Inclosure #9, sketch of a detailed ground-controlled intercept exercise based on a simulated attack over Hungarian territory from direction #1.

In order for the ground director to issue timely corrections to the interceptor, the rate at which the radar information was presented had to be sufficiently high. Intercept capability was greatly improved by the MIG-17 PF (Frisco - D) with the scan odd radar.

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- (9) 1028 hours. When the enemy formation reached this point, the Kecskemet ground controller gave the following directions to its intercept: heading 30 degrees, altitude 10,000 meters, speed 600 kilometers per hour at maximum variation.
- (10) 1033 hours. At this point the Tassar ground controller gave the following corrections to his interceptors: right turn, bank 30 degrees, heading 100 degrees, speed 800 kilometers per hour, target in front.
- (11) 1034 hours. At this point two squadrons of the Papa regiment would be directed to break off the attack and return to base. At the same time, the Tassar regiment would begin its attack against the target.
- (12) 1035 hours. At this point, the Kecskemet ground controller gave the following directions to his interceptors: turn right, bank 30 degrees, heading 100 degrees, altitude 10,000 meters, speed 600 kilometers per hour.
- (13) 1036 hours. At this point, the Papa regiment's last squadron would be directed to break off the attack and return to base. The squadrons would execute a left turn at a directed heading of 260 degrees, at a speed of 600 kilometers per hour.
- (14) 1037 hours. At this point, two squadrons of the Tassar regiment would be ordered to break off the attack and return to base by executing a left bank to a directed heading of 260 degrees, speed 600 kilometers per hour. At the same time the Kecskemet regiment would attack the target.
- (15) 1053 hours. The Rumanian fighters would be scrambled at this point and directed against the target with a right-turn bank of 30 degrees, heading 100 degrees, speed 850 kilometers per hour.
- (16) 1054:30 hours. At this point the last squadron of the Tassar regiment would be directed to break off the attack and probably land at Arad Airfield, Rumania.
- (17) 1055 hours. At this point two squadrons of the Kecskemet Regiment would be directed to break off the attack and return to base or to an alternate airfield, directed heading 250 degrees velocity 600 kilometers per hour. The Rumanian Air Force would then attack.

#### Planned Intercept from Direction No 2

10. Inclosure 3 is a  sketch of a planned ground controlled intercept from Direction No. 2. Numbers in parentheses below refer to numbers on the sketch.

25X1

- (1) R.V.P. - Line of Alert for the Papa Fighter Division.
- (2) R.V.T. - Line of Alert for the Tassar Fighter Division.
- (3) I.V.P. - Line of Controlled Intercept for the Papa Division.

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- (4) E.V.P. - Line of Actual Intercept for the Papa Division.
- (5) I.V.T. - Line of Controlled Intercept for the Taszar Division.
- (6) I.V.K. - Line of Controlled Intercept for the Kecskemet Fighter Division.
- (7) E.V.T. - Line of Actual Intercept for the Taszar Division.
- (8) L.V. 2/3 P. - Break-off Line for 2/3 of the Papa Division.
- (9) E.V.K. - Line of Actual Intercept for the Kecskemet Division.
- (10) L.V. 1/3 P. - Break-off Line for the last third of the Papa Division.
- (11) L.V. 2/3 T. - Break-off Line for 2/3 of the Taszar Division.
- (12) L.V. 1/3 T. - Break-off Line for the last third of the Taszar Division.
- (13) L.V. 2/3 K. - Break-off Line for 2/3 of the Kecskemet Division.


Planned Intercept from Direction No. 3

11. Inclosure 4 is a  sketch of a planned ground-controlled intercept from Direction No. 3. Numbers in parentheses below refer to numbers on the sketch.

25X1

- (1) R.V.P. - Line of Alert for the Papa Division.
- (2) I.V.P. - Line of Controlled Intercept for the Papa Division.
- (3) R.V.K. - Line of Alert for the Kecskemet Fighter Division.
- (4) E.V.P. - Line of Actual Intercept for the Papa Division.
- (5) E.V.K. - Line of Actual Intercept for the Kecskemet Division.
- (6) L.V. 2/3 P. - Break-off Line for the 2/3 of the Papa Division.
- (7) E.V.Sz. - Line of Intercept for the USSR.
- (8) L.V. 1/3 P. - Break-off Line for the last third of the Papa Division
- (9) L.V. 2/3 K. - Break-off Line for 2/3 of the Kecskemet Division.

Planned Intercept from Direction No. 4.

12. Inclosure 5 is a  sketch of a planned ground controlled intercept from Direction No. 4. Numbers in parentheses below refer to numbers on the sketch.

25X1

- (1) R.V.T. - Line of Alert for the Taszar Fighter Division, including the Sarmellek Fighter Regiment.

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
S-E-C-R-E-T  
- 9 -

25X1

- (2) I.V.T. - Line of Controlled Intercept for the Tasszar Division or Sarmellek Regiment.
- (3) R.V.K. - Line of Alert for the Kecskemet Fighter Division.
- (4) E.V.T. - Line of Actual Intercept for the Tasszar Division or the Sarmellek Regiment.
- (5) E.V.K. - Line of Actual Intercept for the Kecskemet Division.
- (6) L.V. 2/3 T. - Break-off Line for 2/3 of the Tasszar Division.
- (7) E.V. Cs. - Line of Actual Intercept for Czechoslovakia.
- (8) L.V. 1/3 T. - Break-off Line for the last third of the Tasszar Division.
- (9) L.V. 2/3 K. - Break-off Line for 2/3 of the Kecskemet Division.

Planned Intercept from Direction No. 5

13.


Inclosure No. 6 is a  sketch of a planned ground-controlled intercept from Direction No. 5. Numbers in parentheses below refer to the numbers on the sketch.

25X1

- (1) R.V.T. - Line of Alert for the Tasszar Division.
- (2) R.V.K. - Line of Alert for the Kecskemet Division.
- (3) I.V.T. - Line of Controlled Intercept for the Tasszar Division or the Sarmellek Regiment.
- (4) E.V.T. - Line of Actual Intercept for the Tasszar Division or the Sarmellek Regiment.
- (5) I.V.K. - Line of Controlled Intercept for the Kecskemet Division or its Regiments at KALOCSA (N 46-32, E 18-59) or KISKUNLACHAZA (N 47-11, E 19-00).
- (6) E.V.K. - Line of Actual Intercept for the Kecskemet Division.
- (7) L.V. 2/3 T. - Break-off Line for 2/3 of the Tasszar Division.
- (8) E.V.Cs. - Line of Actual Intercept for Czechoslovak fighter units.
- (9) L.V. 1/3 T. - Break-off Line for the last third of the Tasszar Division.
- (10) L.V. 2/3 K. - Break-off Line for the 2/3 of the Kecskemet Division.

Planned Intercept from Direction No. 6

14.

Inclosure No. 7 is a  sketch of a planned ground-controlled intercept from Direction No. 6. Numbers in parentheses below refer to numbers on the sketch.

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25X1

- (1) R.V.K. - Line of Alert for the Kecskemet Fighter Division to include the Kaloosa and Kiskunlachaza Regiments.
- (2) I.V.K. - Line of Controlled Intercept for the Kecskemet Division.
- (3) R.V.T. - Line of Alert for the Taszar Division.
- (4) E.V.K. - Line of Actual Intercept for the Kecskemet Division.
- (5) E.V.T. - Line of Actual Intercept for the Taszar Division.
- (6) L.V. 2/3 K. - Break-off line for 2/3 of the Kecskemet Division.
- (7) E.V. Cs. - Line of Actual Intercept for Czechoslovakia.
- (8) L.V. 1/3 K. - Break-off Line for the last third of the Kecskemet Division.
- (9) L.V. 2/3 T. - Break-off Line for 2/3 of the Taszar Division.

Planned Intercept from Direction No. 7.

15. Inclosure No. 8 is a  sketch of a planned ground-controlled intercept from Direction No. 7. Numbers in parentheses below refer to numbers on the sketch.

25X1

- (1) R.V.K. - Line of Alert for the Kecskemet Division.
- (2) I.V.K. - Line of Controlled Intercept for the Kecskemet Division.
- (3) E.V.K. - Line of Actual Intercept for the Kecskemet Division.
- (4) E.V.Cs. - Line of Actual Intercept for Czechoslovakia
- (5) L.V. 2/3 K. - Break-off Line for 2/3 of the Kecskemet Division.

Nine Inclosures:

1.  sketch of seven main directions of expected aerial attack against or through Hungary.
2.  sketch of fighter intercept plan for direction No. 1.
- 3.-8.  sketches of fighter intercepts from six other directions.
9.  sketch of ground-controlled intercept exercise.

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
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**ELFOGAS VEGREHAJTASA É BEREPULESI IRÁNYAI**  
**FIGHTER INTERCEPT EXECUTION FROM N° 7 PENETRATION DIRECTION**  
(IN CASE OF WAR)

ENCLOSURE 8.




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INCLOSURE 7.


ELFOGÁS VÉGREHJÁRTÁSA 6. BEREPLÉSI IRÁNYRA  
FIGHTER INTERCEPT EXECUTION FROM N°6 PENETRATION DIRECTION.  
(IN CASE OF WAR)



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FIGHTER-INTERCEPT EXECUTION FROM 196 PENETRATION DIRECTION  
(IN CASE OF WAR)  
ELFOGÁS VÁGREHATTÁSA 5. BÚREPÜLESI IRÁNYRA.

INCLOSURE 6.



LEGEND.


——— TAZAR 94.HO.91.12.DIX.  
 ——— HECSHEMET 88.HO.66.26.DIX.  
 ——— CSENSLOVANIA CECF FIGHTERS.  
 RV = LINE OF ALERT.  
 IX = LINE OF CONTROLLED INTERCEPT.  
 EV = LINE OF INTERCEPT.  
 LV = PEELING-OFF LINE.

**SECRET**

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INCLOSURE 3.

ELFOGÁS VÉGREHATÁSA 2. BEREPÜLÉSI IRÁNYRA.  
FIGHTER INTERCEPT EXECUTION FROM NO 2 PENETRATION DIRECTION.  
 (IN CASE OF WAR)



LEGEND


- HECSEMETŐRŐK 9th DIV.
- TÁSZÁR 9th DIV.
- PÁPA KÖR. (SOVIET) FIGHTER DIV.
- ROMANIA ROMANIAN FIGHTERS
- RV = LINE OF ALERT
- IV = LINE OF CONTROLLED INTERCEPT
- III = LINE OF INTERCEPT
- II = DEALING-OFF LINE

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INCLOSURE 4.

**SECRET**

**ELFOGÁS VÉGREHAJTÁSA 3. BEREPÜLÉSI IRÁNYRA.**  
**FIGHTER INTERCEPT EXECUTION FROM NO 3 PENETRATION DIRECTION.**  
 (IN CASE OF WAR)




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INCLOSURE 2.

ELFOGÁS VÉGREHATÁSI 1. BEREPLÉSI ÚTVONALRA.  
FIGHTER INTERCEPT EXECUTION FROM NO. 1 PENETRATION DIRECTION.  
 (IN CASE OF WAR)




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INCLOSURE 5.


ELKÖZSÉGVÉGREHATÁSOK IRÁNYA  
FIGHTER INTERCEPT EXECUTION IN PENETRATION DIRECTION  
(IN CASE OF PENETRATION)



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**SECRET**  
**THE MAIN LINES OF EXPECTED AERIAL ATTACKS AGAINST HUNGARY**  
N/A DOKYME RINER ASSIGNED TO THE PRIN. SPECIAL DIV, FILE. FIGHTER DIV. AND GRAB. PRINTER DIV.

**MAGYARORSZÁG TERÜLETÉRE VÁRHATÓ FŐ BEREPLÉSI IRÁNYOK.**  
A PÁPAI KLGS. HO., 91. HO. ÉS A 86. HO. RIASZTÁSI VONALA, TÁMADÁS ESETÉN.  
A RÉP. HO.-K EZEKRE A BEREPLÉSI IRÁNYOKRÓL HANNAK BEGYAKOROLVA.



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INCLOSURE 2

FIGHTER INTERCEPT PLAN AGAINST ENEMY BOMBER FORMATIONS - FROM DIRECTION NO. 1

